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Using the framework of centripetal and centrifugal force, this article analyzes 
alternating periods of peace and conflict in South Korea-Japan mutual perceptions 
since 1998 when the two nations took unprecedented conciliatory actions. 
Centripetal force is comprised of political leaders’ reconciliation initiatives, 
restrained historical/territorial disputes, and common security threats. Centrifugal 
force incorporates heated historical/territorial disputes, political leaders’ use of 
those disputes for their political purposes, and divergent security priorities. This 
article suggests that top political leaders in both nations can play a significant role in 
improving or aggravating mutual perceptions between the two neighbors. However, 
political leaders’ conciliatory initiatives are a necessary but insufficient condition in 
reconciling the two former adversary states. 
Keywords Korea-Japan reconciliation, mutual perceptions, centripetal force,  
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Introduction
It is not easy for former adversary states to attain deep reconciliation. Except in 
a few cases,1 it is quite common that unresolved past wounds continue to impair 
current relationships, as shown in the Sino-Japanese and Greco-Turkish cases. 
The postwar relationship between the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) 
and Japan falls into this category. In 1945 Korea was liberated from 36 years of 
Japanese colonial rule, and three years later the ROK was established. For the next 
two decades, South Korea and Japan did not have diplomatic relations. After long 
and hard negotiations the two countries signed a normalization treaty in 1965, 
but this agreement failed to overcome mutual antagonism. In the years following 
that milestone treaty, the ROK-Japan relationship largely swung between friction 
and limited cooperation (Cha 1999; Yoon 2006). Since the demise of the Cold 
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War the two nations have shared not only democratic governance and free 
market economies, but they have also had the United States as a common ally. 
Despite these favorable factors, they have not been able to reach a successful 
reconciliation.
Fluctuations in South Korea-Japan relations during the post-1998 period 
present an enigma that needs to be carefully analyzed. In 1998 the two former 
adversaries began to adopt groundbreaking conciliatory measures to move their 
relationship forward. Among them were Japan’s first written apology to South 
Korea, the ROK’s acceptance of the Japanese apology, and the opening of South 
Korea’s markets to Japanese cultural products. These acts significantly improved 
the relationship between the two former adversary states at both the inter-
governmental and societal levels. However, this peak of goodwill in the South 
Korea-Japan relationship did not continue for long. Since 1998 the two nations 
have experienced alternating periods of harmony and tension, particularly in 
their perceptions of each other. How, why, and to what extent did these mutual 
perceptions vary between 1998 and 2015? What measures will be necessary to 
improve the relationship between the two neighbors? 
In addressing these questions this article, first of all, presents the significance 
of mutual perceptions in interstate reconciliation and seeks to develop the 
concepts of centripetal and centrifugal force in South Korea-Japan mutual 
perceptions. It then explores how both centripetal and centrifugal forces worked 
in four cross-temporal cases during the period 1998-2015 and which forces 
affected ROK-Japan mutual perceptions the most. After analyzing the impact 
of these contradictory forces on their perceptions, some findings and policy 
recommendations are proposed that could improve the relationship in the long 
term. The main argument is that political leaders’ conciliatory initiatives are a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for reconciling these two former adversary 
states. A more fundamental factor should be for both governments and societies 
to make every effort to reduce a huge historical perception gap between the two 
nations. Political initiatives could be helpful in reconciling the former adversaries, 
but they could produce a much more successful reconciliation if more favorable 
mutual perceptions of each other existed.
Mutual Perceptions in Interstate Reconciliation
As many scholars note, reconciliation between former adversary states contains 
both government-to-government and people-to-people dimensions (He 
2009; Feldman 2012; Chun 2015). The intergovernmental dimension includes 
diplomatic normalization, stable peace, the issuance of apologetic statements, 
the provision of official reparations or compensations, and comprehensive and 
smooth economic interactions. The popular dimension places great emphasis on 
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harmonious mutual feeling. These two dimensions could work in an interactive 
manner. Intergovernmental reconciliation could produce harmonious mutual 
feelings among ordinary citizens, while such harmonious mutual feelings could 
serve as a catalyst for stimulating reconciliation at the intergovernmental level.
This article pays special attention to the popular dimension of interstate 
reconciliation for the following two reasons. First, adopting mutual perceptions 
as a dependent variable is extremely useful in avoiding a tautology, which is 
primarily caused by the adoption of very similar dependent and independent 
variables. As analyzed later, this article examines the roles of top political leaders 
and common, or divergent, security priorities as independent variables, which 
are also closely linked to the intergovernmental dimension of reconciliation. 
Second, the improvement in mutual perceptions is an extremely important 
component in interstate reconciliation. Mutually favorable feelings reflect an 
improved relationship between former adversaries, laying the groundwork for 
top political leaders to adopt further reconciliatory initiatives. On the other 
hand, unfavorable mutual perceptions could easily dampen cooperative measures 
taken by state leaders on the basis of shared strategic and/or economic interests. 
The recent diplomatic agreement on comfort women, made between the South 
Korean and Japanese governments on December 28, 2015, is a good example 
of how significant mutual perceptions are in achieving interstate reconciliation. 
Many advocates of former comfort women in South Korea were outraged by 
the agreement because the ROK government did not even consult the elderly 
comfort women survivors until after the deal was struck. Furthermore, the 
unfavorable perception of Japan by South Koreans further weakened the validity 
of the political deal, even though it was more conciliatory than earlier statements 
in terms of the acknowledgement of the Japanese government’s responsibility 
(though not legal responsibility) for the misdeeds and the offer of Japanese 
governmental funds for compensating comfort women survivors (New York 
Times 2015).
Analytical Framework: Centripetal vs. Centrifugal Force 
Many scholars have tried to explain South Korea-Japan relations by focusing on 
various variables, including historical grievances (Lee 1985; Cheong 1991), the 
U.S. role (Cha 1999), threat perception (Yoon 2006; Park 2008a), NGOs’ activities 
(Ku 2008), and national identity (Kim 2015; Glosserman and Snyder 2015). 
However, the existing literature lacks direct analysis of factors that influence 
South Korea-Japan mutual perceptions. To fill this gap in the extant literature, 
this article analyzes variations in ROK-Japan mutual perceptions during the 
post-1998 period by emphasizing the dynamics between political leaders and 
historical/territorial disputes, as well as common or divergent security priorities. 
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Particular emphasis is placed on these three variables,2 as they could have direct 
impact on ROK-Japan mutual perceptions. In addition, as shown in Table 1, 
the three key factors could work as either centripetal or centrifugal forces in 
impacting mutual perceptions between the two former adversary nations. In this 
article, centripetal force is defined as the power to make South Korea and Japan 
move toward mutual understanding and cooperation, while centrifugal force is 
the energy that pulls the two former adversaries apart from each other. 
Two complementary models seem pertinent to explain the variance in South 
Korea-Japan mutual perceptions during the post-1998 period. First, compatible 
with one of primary tenets of realism, sharing a common security threat, such as 
the North Korean nuclear/missile adventurism and the rise of China, could make 
the former adversaries move toward mutual cooperation and understanding 
(Walt 1987; Yoon 2006). On the other hand, divergent security priorities could 
work as a centrifugal force that pulls the two nations apart from each other. For 
instance, South Korea made serious efforts to engage North Korea despite its 
provocative acts during the 1998-2007 period, while Japan maintained a hardline 
policy toward North Korea during that period due to the North’s nuclear/missile 
adventurism and the abduction issue.  
Second, top political leaders’ reconciliatory initiatives could serve as a 
vehicle for improving mutual perceptions between South Korea and Japan, as 
they directly address historical issues or stimulate mutual cooperation measures 
(Bargal and Sivan 2004). As illustrated in Figure 1, reconciliation gestures by 
top political leaders include coming to terms with past misdeeds, such as the 
issuance of sincere apologetic statements by Japan, thus helping improve ROK-
Japan mutual perceptions. As a consequence, increasingly positive media 
coverage of such political acts may contribute to the improvement of their mutual 
perceptions as well. Such initiatives could also lead to the deepening of economic 
interdependence by stimulating trade and investment between the two countries. 
As liberalism posits, the growth of economic interdependence could contribute to 
improving their mutual perceptions, because gaining economic benefits weakens 
the desire to move toward conflict. Such political acts could also increase cultural 
and human exchanges between the two nations. As constructivism denotes, the 
growth of cultural/human exchanges can play an important role in cultivating a 
favorable perception of each other since through social interactions they create 
Table 1. Key Factors that Constitute Centripetal and Centrifugal Force
Factors Centripetal Force Centrifugal Force
Top Leaders Reconciliation gestures Political use of disputes
History/territory Restrained disputes Heated disputes
Security Common threat Divergent security priorities
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opportunities to promote understanding of their nations’ cultures and values 
(Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998). On the other hand, political leaders’ 
frequent use of historical/territorial disputes as tools for achieving their own 
political purposes is harmful to mutual perceptions. These political acts can 
bring about a spillover effect into different sectors, thus constricting economic 
interaction, as well as cultural and human exchanges. Such acts can also lead to 
extremely negative media coverage regarding the counterpart country. All of 
these adverse consequences will tend to increase mutual antagonism between the 
two nations. 
Related to the role of top political leaders, restrained or heated historical/
territorial disputes themselves can exert direct influence on ROK-Japan mutual 
perceptions. As South Korean society became democratized in the late 1980s, 
many civil society organizations that had been suppressed during three decades of 
authoritarian rule began to raise their voices. These voices now criticized Japan’s 
past wrongdoings, including sexual slavery, forced labor, and harsh colonial rule 
(Shin 2014). At the same time, Japanese society also started to come to terms 
with its war responsibility, as the ideological confrontation with the communist 
bloc receded with the end of the Cold War. This process involved a series of 
historical disputes, including the issues of comfort women, forced labor, Japanese 
history textbooks, and the Yasukuni Shrine. Also intensified were territorial 
disputes surrounding Dokdo/Takeshima Island. Such escalated historical/
territorial disputes produce anger and resentment between former adversary 
nations, seriously damaging mutual perceptions. Those conflicts could dampen 
economic, cultural, and human exchanges as well. On the contrary, de-escalation 
Figure 1. The Impact of Political Leaders on Mutual Perceptions
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of historical/territorial disputes, either by political leaders’ conciliatory initiatives, 
or because of the weakness of social movements to trigger those disputes, could 
provide a favorable environment in which the two nations improve their mutual 
perceptions (Kim 2014). 
Using this analytical framework, the subsequent sections provide an 
empirical analysis of the varying dynamics of centripetal and centrifugal forces 
and how they helped to frame mutual perceptions between South Korea and 
Japan from 1998 to 2015.  
Explaining South Korea-Japan Mutual Perceptions between 1998 
and 2015
This article focuses on the 17 years after 1998, the year when South Korean 
President Kim Dae-jung and Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo took 
unprecedented reconciliation measures. Analyzing the 1998-2015 period 
is particularly important in the sense that it shows clear changes in mutual 
perceptions between the two nations caused by alternating centripetal and 
centrifugal forces. In other words, the relationship between Koreans and Japanese 
since 1998 has fluctuated notably depending on the extent to which centrifugal 
forces have overwhelmed centripetal forces, and vice-versa. The 1998-2000 
period witnessed powerful centripetal forces that markedly improved mutual 
perceptions, while centrifugal forces dominated the years between 2011-2015. 
The intervening periods, between 2001-2007 and 2008-2010, saw the level of 
mutual perceptions fall into the middle, between the two extremes.   
Phase I, 1998-2000: Overwhelming Centripetal Force → Significant Upgrading in 
Perceptions
From 1998 to 2000 centripetal forces in South Korea-Japan relations were 
exceptionally strong. Reconciliation initiatives by political leaders were dramatic 
and unprecedented. At a 1998 summit meeting, Japanese Prime Minster 
Obuchi Keizo, for the first time by a Japanese leader, issued a written apology 
for the sufferings inflicted on the Korean people during Japanese colonial rule 
from 1910-1945. Korean President Kim Dae-jung gladly accepted the apology. 
Moreover, the two leaders declared a new Korea-Japan partnership towards 
the 21st century. As a concrete demonstration of the declaration, the Korean 
government gradually opened the nation’s markets to Japanese cultural products, 
a measure that would have been unimaginable in the past (Moon and Suh 2005, 
564). This political action played a key role in promoting cultural exchanges and 
laid the groundwork for the rise of hallyu (“Korean Wave” of popular cultural 
outflows) in Japan after 2003. 
Though still debatable, the primary motives for President Kim taking these 
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unprecedented actions may have been the eruption of the 1997-1998 Asian 
financial crisis and the adoption of the so-called Sunshine Policy, an engagement 
policy toward North Korea (Cho 2015). Since the financial crisis had seriously 
damaged the South Korean economy, President Kim desperately needed 
economic support from Japan. It was also necessary for him to gain Japanese 
political and diplomatic support for pursuit of a new engagement policy toward 
North Korea. In the same vein, it was necessary for Prime Minister Obuchi 
to cooperate with President Kim in order to effectively cope with the fallout 
from North Korea’s launch, in August 1998, of a long-range Taepodong missile 
that flew over Japan. This incident clearly endangered the nation’s security. 
Although these realpolitik concerns may have prompted the two leaders to 
take reconciliatory measures, the political will by the leaders themselves for 
reconciliation was indispensable as a catalyst for their actions (Ku 2008). 
These reconciliatory initiatives increased positive media coverage of the 
ROK-Japan relationship in both nations. According to Ji Young Kim (2015, 494), 
Yomiuri Shimbun and Sankei Shimbun reported that the Kim-Obuchi summit 
played a pivotal role in improving ROK-Japan relations by resolving the history 
problem. Many South Korean media outlets also covered the event in a highly 
positive manner, despite a critical evaluation that the declaration of a new Korea-
Japan partnership toward the 21st century did not thoroughly deal with the 
history problem (Hankyoreh 1998; Hankook Ilbo 1998). As another derivative 
effect, economic interdependence between the two countries deepened. Their 
trade volume in 1993 was about $31 billion but, by 1999, it had increased to 
approximately $40 billion (Korea International Trade Association 2011). In the 
wake of the historic 1998 summit the two governments began to consider a 
Korea-Japan Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Although negotiations over the FTA 
eventually ceased in November 2004, for economic and political reasons (Lee 
2013), nevertheless it was evident that during the 1998-2000 period the two 
nations anticipated deeper economic cooperation through successful conclusion 
of an FTA.
In addition to these major factors, it should be added that the prospect of 
jointly hosting the 2002 World Cup as well as the increase in human exchanges 
also served as catalysts for improving mutual perceptions. The number of Korean 
visitors to Japan increased from 914,155 in 1991 to 1,100,939 in 2000, while 
the number of Japanese visitors to South Korea showed even more remarkable 
growth, from 1,455,090 in 1991 to 2,472,054 in 2000 (Korea National Tourism 
Organization 2000). 
A commonly perceived  security threat from North Korea also increased 
the centripetal force during this period. North Korea’s missile adventurism 
caused the two nations to recognize that they shared common security concerns. 
The Taepodong missile flight in the skies over Japan shocked the Japanese and 
increased the necessity of bilateral cooperation. As a result, the two countries 
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agreed to enhance security cooperation in order to deter North Korea’s military 
threat, although the scope of the security cooperation actually remained at the 
level of rudimentary confidence-building measures, such as military exchanges 
and joint trainings. However, it should be noted that the threat perception of 
the two nations diverged somewhat when President Kim Dae-jung initiated the 
Sunshine Policy toward North Korea, diluting the centripetal force. In other 
words, Japan continued to have a strong threat perception deriving from North 
Korea’s missile adventurism, while South Korea began to have a more lenient 
perception toward North Korea (Kim 2015, 492-493). 
On the other hand, the centrifugal force was far weaker than the centripetal 
force during this period. As noted above, the divergent threat perceptions of 
North Korea worked as a centrifugal force. However, no heated historical or 
territorial disputes between the two nations erupted, despite the fact that the 
transnational comfort women movement and legal lawsuits of Korean forced 
laborers in Japanese courts continued (Ku 2015, 261-262). In addition, political 
leaders in both nations refrained from utilizing historical/territorial issues for 
promoting their domestic popularity during this period.
As a consequence of stronger centripetal forces, South Korean and Japanese 
public perceptions of one another significantly improved. As shown in Table 
2 Table 2, 68.9% of Korean people had an unfavorable perception of Japan in 
1995, but this percentage decreased to 42.2% in 2000. The percentage of Koreans 
who had favorable feelings toward Japan shifted from 5.5% in 1995 to 17.1% in 
2000, although this number was still low in absolute terms. In a similar vein, 
Table 2. Koreans’ Perceptions of Japan (unit: percent)3
Year 1990 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2005 2010 2011 2015
Dislike 66 68.9 65 42.6 42.2 56.6 63 36 50 50
Like 5.4 5.5 8 9.6 17.1 12.1 8 11 12 6
Source: Donga Daily (1990-2015)
Table 3. Japanese Perceptions of Korea (unit: percent)4
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2004
Feel No Intimacy 53 54 59.9 57.5 49.8 46.9 44 45.5/40.5 41/39.2
Feel Intimacy 41.9 42.2 35.8 37.9 46.2 48.3 51.4 50.3/54.2 55/56.7
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014
Feel No Intimacy 44.3 47.1 42.6 40.9 34.2 36 35.3/58 58 66.4
Feel Intimacy 51.1 48.5 54.8 57.1 63.1 61.8 62.2/39.2 40.7 31.5
Source: Japanese Cabinet Office (1995-2014)
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53% of Japanese citizens felt no friendship with South Korea in 1995, but this 
number decreased to 46.9% in 2000, as illustrated in Table 3. In terms of positive 
feelings toward South Korea, the numbers increased from 41.9% in 1995 to 
48.3% in 2000. The year 2000 was the first time when the percentage of Japanese 
who had favorable feelings toward Korea became larger than that of Japanese 
who disagreed. During the period 1998-2000, therefore, the centripetal force 
created by South Korea-Japan reconciliation was very strong, producing an 
unprecedented improvement in mutual perceptions. 
Phase II, 2001-2007: Powerful Centrifugal Force → Notable Downturn in (Korean) 
Perceptions
The period between 2001 and 2007 saw a significantly different dynamic 
between centripetal and centrifugal forces. Unlike in the first phase, the latter 
overwhelmed the former during the second period. The centrifugal force 
significantly increased due to the escalation of historical and territorial disputes 
as well as the use by political leaders of those controversies as instruments to 
achieve their political purposes. 
In April 2001 the Japanese Ministry of Education approved a nationalistic 
history textbook written by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform 
(Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsukuru Kai, hereafter Tsukurukai). This event 
triggered harsh South Korean and Chinese protests, as the Tsukurukai textbook 
whitewashed and justified Japan’s past misdeeds, including sexual slavery, forced 
labor, and the Nanjing Massacre (Saaler 2005, 41-42). Thanks to this textbook 
issue, historical disputes between Japan and its former adversaries have become 
regular occurrences. When the Japanese government has announced its approval 
of new nationalistic school textbooks every four years, the South Korean and 
Chinese governments, as well as nongovernmental organizations such as the 
Asia Peace and History Education Network in South Korea and the Children and 
Textbooks Japan Network 21, have vehemently protested against the Japanese 
government’s action (Ku 2014, 272-277). Moreover, the textbook issue has made 
historical disputes between South Korea and Japan far more intense since it is 
closely linked to other contentious issues such as sexual slavery and Dokdo/
Takeshima Island. The Japanese government has approved school textbooks 
that removed descriptions of the comfort women issue and included depictions 
of Dokdo/Takeshima as Japanese territory. Needless to say, these actions have 
augmented Korean fury against Japan. 
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro also worsened South Korean 
perceptions of Japan by making annual visits, from 2001 to 2006, to the Yasukuni 
Shrine, considered a symbol of Japanese war aggression (Cheung 2010). Though 
not an ardent historical revisionist, Koizumi needed to gain support from 
conservative and nationalist forces within Japan in order to push for his neoliberal 
economic reforms, such as the privatization of Japan Post (Economist 2006). Thus, 
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his annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, where 14 war criminals were enshrined 
in 1978, augmented his domestic popularity, but such acts enraged South Koreans 
and the Chinese, who were the main victims of Japan’s past militarism.
Furthermore, in February 2005 the Shimane prefectural assembly enacted a 
bill designating February 22 as “Takeshima Day.” On the same day, the Japanese 
ambassador to South Korea, at a press conference for the foreign media held 
in Seoul, declared Japan’s sovereignty over Dokdo/Takeshima. In April 2005, 
the Japanese government again announced the approval of the Tsukurukai 
textbooks that contained Japan’s claims of sovereignty over the island but omitted 
mentioning Japan’s past wrongs during World War II. In response South Korean 
President Roh Moo-hyun declared a “diplomatic war with Japan” in March 2005. 
Although Japan’s provocative actions were a main cause of the downturn in the 
relationship at this time, President Roh was not free from the accusation that he 
used historical/territorial disputes with Japan to reverse his declining domestic 
popularity (Park 2008b, 18-21). Abe Shinzo, during his short tenure as prime 
minister (2006-2007), further aggravated South Korean perceptions of Japan. As 
part of his campaign to make Japanese historical narratives more nationalistic, he 
denied Japan’s involvement in the forced mobilization of comfort women, a point 
that had been officially acknowledged by the Japanese government in 1993 (Yang 
2008, 74-75).
During this second phase, South Korean news media extensively addressed 
such historical/territorial disputes, significantly increasing negative coverage 
criticizing Japan for its unapologetic stance on past misdeeds.5 An editorial article 
in Hankook Ilbo (2005) pointed out that the Tsukurukai textbook, which had been 
again approved by the Japanese government, still showed historical descriptions 
justifying Japan’s colonial rule over Korea and its aggressive war. The article urged 
Japan to consider the future of Asia by correcting its distorted historical views. 
While criticizing Japan’s attempts to render Dokdo a disputed area, another 
editorial pressed the ROK government to strengthen its sovereignty over Dokdo 
by adopting a series of practical measures, such as allowing the public to visit 
the island and enacting a special bill to develop the site (Seoul Shinmun 2005). 
As an intervening variable, all of this negative media coverage contributed to the 
deterioration of South Korean perceptions of Japan.
In addition, the diverging security priorities between South Korea and 
Japan continued to work as a centrifugal force. The South Korean government 
continued to adopt the Sunshine Policy based on closer relations with North 
Korea, even though Pyongyang had revealed a secret uranium-enrichment 
nuclear program in October 2002 and had conducted its first nuclear test in 
October 2006. In contrast, Japan largely took a hardline policy due to North 
Korea’s continuous nuclear/missile adventurism and the abductions of Japanese 
citizens by North Korea. Prime Minister Koizumi and North Korean leader 
Kim Jong-il had made a joint Pyongyang Declaration in September 2002, 
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which promised to overcome past grievances and promote bilateral cooperation 
between the two countries. However, the abduction issue, which had been 
admitted by Kim Jong-il as a reconciliatory measure at the 2002 summit meeting 
with Koizumi, seriously damaged Japan-North Korea relations, because the North 
Korean regime did not reveal accurate information regarding the 17 Japanese 
abductees (Arrington 2013). As a consequence, the Japanese government 
maintained its stance that “without the resolution of this issue, there can be no 
normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea” (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan 2015).
Compared to this powerful centrifugal force, centripetal forces were quite 
weak during this second period. President Kim Dae-jung’s conciliatory stance 
towards Japan regressed somewhat due to the rise of the textbook dispute in 
2001. President Roh and Prime Minister Koizumi actually attempted to move 
the ROK-Japan relationship forward in early 2003. However, such conciliatory 
gestures did not culminate in improved bilateral cooperation. Rather, the two 
leaders later became embroiled in a harsh diplomatic rupture by utilizing 
historical/territorial issues as a vehicle for boosting their domestic popularity, as 
noted above. Nevertheless, the two nations continued to deepen their economic 
interdependence. Trade volume drastically increased from $43.1 billion in 2001 
to $82.6 billion in 2007 (Korea International Trade Organization 2011).
Despite the eruption of serious historical/territorial disputes, the Korean 
cultural boom in Japan may have played a critical role in defusing the negative 
influence of the centrifugal forces (Glosserman and Snyder 2015, 7). Following 
the broadcast, in April 2003, of the Korean drama “Winter Sonata” on Japanese 
public television, Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK), hallyu started to become 
widespread in Japan. The sales of DVDs and books related to “Winter Sonata” 
reached about ¥14.5 billion during the entire period between 2003 and 2005 
(Choi 2012, 220). After 2005 NHK and many other private broadcasters televised 
numerous Korean dramas. As a result, many Korean celebrities, K-pop singers 
and movie/soap opera actors became very popular in Japanese society. As shown 
in Table 3, this strong impact of hallyu in Japan could explain why Japanese 
perceptions of South Korea were not aggravated, but instead slightly improved, 
despite powerful centrifugal forces during the second period. Similarly, Japanese 
cultural products, including manga and computer games, began to be widely 
consumed in South Korea, but this did not prevent South Korean perceptions of 
Japan from becoming more aggravated. 
Unlike the first phase, therefore, in the second phase centrifugal forces 
overwhelmed centripetal forces, seriously damaging South Korean perceptions 
of Japan. As illustrated in Table 2, Koreans’ unfavorable perceptions of Japan 
increased from 42.2% in 2000 to 63% in 2005, whereas Koreans’ favorable feelings 
toward Japan decreased from 17.1% to 8% during the same time period. On the 
other hand, Table 3 shows that the more positive image that the Japanese had of 
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South Korea did not vary notably during the period, thanks to the positive impact 
of hallyu. As Figures 2 and 3 illuminate, other public opinion surveys, conducted 
by Donga Daily and Asahi Shimbun, show negative changes in mutual perceptions 
between the two nations at this time. In 2000, 39% of Korean respondents replied 
that South Korea-Japan relations were going well, while 60% said the opposite. 
In 2005 only 6.5% of Korean respondents assessed South Korea-Japan relations 
positively, while 93.5% expressed negative views. In the Japanese case, 58% of the 
respondents perceived that Japan-South Korea relations were progressing well, 
whereas only 26% said the opposite in 2000. These numbers changed to 26% and 
Source: Donga Daily (1997-2015)
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centripetal forces, seriously damaging South Korean perceptions of Japan. As illustrated in Table 
2, Koreans’ unfavorable perceptions of Japan increased from 42.2% in 2000 to 63% in 2005, 
whereas Koreans’ favorable feelings toward Japan decreased from 17.1% to 8% during the same 
time period. On the other hand, Table 3 shows that the more positive image that the Japanese had 
of South Korea did not vary notably during the period, thanks to the positive impact of hallyu. 
As Figures 2 and 3 illuminate, other public opinion surveys, conducted by Donga Daily and 
Asahi Shimbun, show negative changes in mutual perceptions between the two nations at this 
time. In 2000, 39% of Korean respondents replied that South Korea-Japan relations were going 
well, while 60% said the opposite. In 2005 only 6.5% of Korean respondents assessed South 
Korean-Japan positively, while 93.5% expressed negative views. In the Japanese case, 58% of 
the respondents perceived that Japan-South Korea relations were progressing well, whereas only 
26% said the opposite in 2000. These numbers changed to 26% and 61% in 2005, respectively. 
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61% respectively in 2005.
Phase III 2008-2010: Strong Centripetal Force → Rebounded Favorable Perceptions 
Compared to the second phase, the period between 2008-2010 saw a significant 
decrease in the strength of centrifugal forces while witnessing a notable increase 
in centripetal forces. During this third period, top political leaders did not use 
historical/territorial issues as a vehicle for their political purposes. There were 
also no intense historical or territorial disputes that fanned Korean and Japanese 
nationalistic sentiments, although the transnational comfort women movement, 
aimed at pressuring the Japanese government to officially acknowledge that 
Japan’s military “comfort system” was a systemic war crime, continued. The 
previously divergent security priorities between South Korea and Japan vis-à-vis 
North Korea shifted to a converging one, as discussed below.  
The first change in centripetal forces was the increased number of 
reconciliation gestures by top political leaders. On February 25, 2008, when Lee 
Myung-bak was inaugurated as the South Korean President, he held a summit 
with Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo. They agreed to take a future-
oriented approach toward historical issues that had bedeviled South Korea-Japan 
relations (Kang and Lee 2008). In a speech commemorating Korea’s March 1st 
Independence Movement, President Lee emphasized pragmatic diplomacy as 
opposed to calling upon Japan to make sincere apologies and follow-up actions. 
This was a clear departure from former President Roh’s approach. 
After the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took power in August 2009, the 
first DPJ Prime Minister, Hatoyama Yukio, adopted a highly conciliatory policy 
toward his nation’s East Asian neighbors. Moving beyond a U.S.-centric foreign 
policy, Hatoyama sought to cultivate close ties with neighboring countries, 
particularly China and South Korea. In 1999 Hatoyama joined a political team, 
which consisted of Diet members from the Japanese Communist Party and the 
Social Democratic Party, in proposing a bill to establish an investigative body to 
deal with Japan’s war crimes. After proclaiming he would not visit the Yasukuni 
Shrine, he also proposed moving the memorial tablets of the fourteen class-A 
war criminals from the shrine to a less controversial location (Yang and Lim 
2009, 66). In August 2010 the next DPJ Prime Minister, Kan Naoto, also issued 
an apology to South Korea for its brutal colonial rule, and he even promised to 
return historical documents and other cultural artifacts taken from the Korean 
Peninsula during Japanese colonial rule (New York Times 2010). During this third 
phase, therefore, top political leaders in both nations made efforts to improve 
South Korea-Japan relations, and neither used historical or territorial disputes to 
buttress their domestic popularity.
Also, economic interdependence deepened and cultural exchanges between 
the two nations flourished during this third phase. In 2011 bilateral trade volume 
increased to approximately $107 billion, whereas it had been approximately $82 
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billion in 2007 (Korea International Trade Association 2011). The Korean cultural 
boom, hallyu, was still a dynamic force in Japanese society (Takeda 2011). 
In addition, after the conservative Lee Myung-bak government came to 
power, in February 2008, South Korean policy toward North Korea shifted 
drastically, from engagement to a hardline policy based on clear reciprocity. 
While pointing out the failure of the Sunshine Policy, President Lee launched 
an initiative for “Denuclearization, Openness, and 3000.” This meant that 
“South Korea would provide assistance to North Korea in cooperation with the 
international community to help it attain US$3,000 in per capita income within 
10 years if the North gives up its nuclear programs” (Yoon 2008). This initiative 
was regarded as a hostile policy by North Korea. Thus, this policy shift worked 
as a centripetal force in South Korea-Japan relations, as the previously diverging 
security priority changed into a converging one. Furthermore, a series of military 
incidents on the Korean Peninsula significantly augmented the centripetal 
force. In May 2009, the North Korean regime conducted its second nuclear test, 
drastically heightening tensions in the East Asian region. Furthermore, a North 
Korean torpedo attack most likely sank the South Korean navy ship Cheonan 
in March 2010 (Bechtol 2010). Moreover, North Korea’s first direct attack on 
South Korean territory since the Korean War took place in November 2010 on 
Yeonpyeong Island. All of these incidents increased the desire of South Korea and 
Japan to enhance mutual cooperation in response to the growing North Korean 
threat. 
All of these positive factors strengthening the centripetal force drew the two 
nations closer together. As shown in Table 2, Koreans’ unfavorable perception 
of Japan significantly decreased from 63% in 2005 to 36% in 2010. Table 3 
indicates that positive Japanese feelings for South Korea increased from 51.1% 
in 2005 to 61.8% in 2010. Figures 2 and 3 also show that in 2005, 93% of Korean 
respondents said current South Korea-Japan relations were not going well, while 
56% of them agreed with this view in 2010. In Japan, 61% of the respondents said 
the relationship was not going well in 2005, but this number decreased to 57% in 
2010.   
Phase IV, 2011-2015: Dominant Centrifugal Force → Dramatic Downturn in 
Perceptions  
Unlike in the third phase, the time period between 2011 and 2015 saw a dramatic 
increase in centrifugal factors with a notable decrease in centripetal force, in the 
end seriously damaging mutual perceptions of both the Korean and Japanese 
peoples.  
During this fourth phase there were only two factors that increased the 
centripetal force.  The first was a powerful earthquake, a devastating tsunami, and 
the threat of radioactive contamination that struck Japan in March 2011. As soon 
as these disasters erupted, the South Korean government and public were willing 
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to help the Japanese. These humanitarian initiatives, though, did not affect Japan’s 
stance on its claims of sovereignty over the Dokdo/Takeshima.6 The second factor 
was the necessity of security cooperation in the face of the North Korean nuclear/
missile threat (Lewis 2013). In February 2013 the Kim Jong-un regime displayed 
unprecedented military aggressiveness toward the United States and South Korea 
by launching a long-range missile and conducting a third nuclear test. 
On the other hand, various elements amplified the centrifugal force during 
this period. The most significant factors were Japanese Prime Minister Abe 
Shinzo’s unreflective, provocative stance on historical/territorial issues and Korean 
President Lee Myung-bak’s political use of those issues. In December 2013 Prime 
Minister Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine without considering the disapproval of 
neighboring nations (CNN News 2013). Demonstrating an unapologetic stance 
on the issue of comfort women, in June 2014, the Abe administration reviewed 
the process of formulating the Kono Statement, announcing that the statement 
was made by a political compromise between the Japanese and South Korean 
governments. This stance undermined the validity of the Kono Statement, which 
in 1993 had, for the first time, acknowledged Japan’s involvement in the forced 
mobilization of comfort women (Japan Times 2014). The Abe government has 
also sought to make Japanese history textbooks and education in general more 
nationalistic by attempting to revise textbook screening standards and teacher 
practice manuals for school curriculum guidelines (New York Times 2013). The 
purpose was to include sympathetic views of Japanese expansion in World War 
II in school textbooks and underscore the Japanese government’s position that 
the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima and Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are indigenous 
territories of Japan.
Furthermore, without critically reflecting upon its past, in July 2014, the Abe 
government reinterpreted the war-renouncing Article 9 of the peace constitution 
and enabled Japan to claim the right to collective self-defense, which would allow 
the nation to come to the aid of an ally under armed attack (Guardian 2014). In 
2015, despite strong protests from the Japanese public, the Abe administration 
pushed controversial security bills through the Lower House (in July) and Upper 
House (in October) of the Diet (Japan Times 2015; Diplomat 2015). It goes 
without saying that South Korean news media harshly criticized Abe’s provocative 
acts. All of these dynamics greatly increased distrust and anger among the Korean 
people, seriously damaging Koreans’ perceptions of Japan.  
Meanwhile, Korean President Lee began to take a harsh stance on historical 
issues after August 2011, when the Korean Constitutional Court announced a 
ruling that the South Korean government had not done enough to seek redress 
from Japan on behalf of former South Korean comfort women and forced 
laborers (Etsuro 2013). Affected by this court ruling, President Lee raised his 
voice over the issue of comfort women and in a summit meeting with Japanese 
Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko, in December 2011, strongly pushed Japan to 
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resolve the longstanding issue (Chosun Daily 2011).   
President Lee took a series of actions in August 2012 that seriously hurt 
Japanese perceptions of Korea. Lee suddenly visited the Dokdo/Takeshima, using 
Japan as a scapegoat to restore his declining domestic popularity (New York Times 
2012). Furthermore, in response to Japan’s proposal to bring the territorial dispute 
to the International Court of Justice, President Lee commented that Japan’s 
influence in the international community was not be as powerful as it once was 
(Korea Times 2012). Even though the Japanese government had shown no intent 
to send Emperor Akihito to visit South Korea, Lee remarked that the emperor 
would not be welcome without a direct acknowledgment of guilt for Japan’s 
colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945 (Asahi Shimbun 2012). 
These actions by President Lee unnecessarily stirred up anti-Korean sentiment 
among the Japanese. 
Park Geun-hye, who succeeded Lee as Korean president in February 2013, 
also took a highly antagonistic stance regarding the Abe government’s unreflective 
historical views, particularly toward the comfort women issue. Thus, for the first 
two and a half years of her term President Park refused to hold a summit meeting 
with Prime Minister Abe. In contrast, Park had multiple summits with Chinese 
President Xi Jinping, reflecting much friendlier relations between South Korea 
and China. This may also have contributed to a negative perception of South 
Korea among the Japanese public.7
Influenced by these Korean leaders’ negative actions, the Korean cultural 
boom in Japan regressed notably. For instance, many broadcasters that had 
continually televised Korean dramas after the “Winter Sonata” debut in 2003, 
changed their attitudes. Right after President Lee’s visit to the Dokdo/Takeshima, 
in August 2012, Fuji TV stopped televising Korean dramas. TBS ceased to 
broadcast Korean dramas in March 2014. NHK also ceased to televise Korean 
dramas in August 2015 and, as of October 2015, showed no intention to resume 
broadcasting them (Kyunghyang Shinmun 2015b). In addition, President Lee’s 
visit to the island played a key role in fanning anti-Korea sentiment in Japan. 
Since 2012, anti-Korean protests, initiated by Japanese nationalist groups, have 
taken place more often within Japan, and many conservative/nationalist Japanese 
magazines and books have expressed anti-Korean sentiments (Joogang-Sisa 
Magazine 2015).
Furthermore, the trade volume between South Korea and Japan decreased 
significantly after 2011, although the two countries have largely maintained their 
economic interdependence. In 2011 their bilateral trade volume was $108 billion. 
This number decreased to $95 billion in 2013 and to $72 billion in 2015, mainly 
due to the weak Japanese yen and Korea’s reduced reliance on Japanese parts and 
materials (Korea Herald 2014). The possibility of concluding an FTA between 
South Korea and Japan also weakened as the Korea placed a higher priority on its 
FTA negotiations with China.  
Centripetal versus Centrifugal Force 69
As a result of the predominance of centrifugal over centripetal force, this 
fourth phase saw a significant deterioration of both nations’ perceptions of the 
other. As shown in Table 2, Koreans’ unfavorable perception of Japan shifted 
from 36% in 2010 to 50% in 2011 and 2015. Table 3 also illustrates that 36% of 
Japanese respondents felt negatively about South Korea in 2010, but this number 
increased to 66.4% in 2014. Figures 2 and 3 indicate movement in the same 
direction. In 2010, 56% of South Korean respondents said that South Korea-Japan 
relations were not going well, but this number increased to 90% in 2015. In the 
Japanese case, 57% of the respondents perceived that Japan-ROK relations were 
not going well in 2010, but this increased to 86% in 2015. Other public opinion 
polls conducted by the East Asia Institute and the Genron NPO also reflected 
these worsened mutual perceptions. The percentage of Koreans having a negative 
image of Japan was 76.6% in 2013, 70.9% in 2014, and 72.5% in 2015. Japanese 
people’s negative image of Korea rose from 37.3% in 2013, to 54.4% in 2014 and 
52.4% in 2015 (Jeong 2015). 
Concluding Remarks with Policy Recommendations 
This article has explored how centripetal and centrifugal forces have shaped 
South Korea-Japan mutual perceptions from 1998 to 2015. The article has three 
important findings. First, top political leaders in both nations have played 
significant roles in improving or aggravating the mutual perceptions of the two 
nations. As noted before, the reconciliation initiatives taken by South Korean 
President Kim Dae-jung and Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo contributed 
greatly to improving mutual perceptions and constraining the eruption of 
historical/territorial disputes. On the other hand, Prime Ministers Koizumi and 
Abe served as catalysts for worsening Koreans’ impression of Japan, because they 
had an unreflective stance on Japan’s past wrongs, and they often used historical 
issues for raising their domestic popularity. In a similar vein, Presidents Roh 
Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak took advantage of territorial and historical 
disputes in order to reverse their declining domestic popularity, thus damaging 
Japanese perceptions of South Korea. 
Related to this finding, political leaders’ reconciliation initiatives have been 
a necessary condition for reconciling the two former adversaries, but they are 
not a sufficient condition for achieving that goal. The fanning of historical and/or 
territorial disputes, which are usually laden with strong nationalistic sentiments 
in both nations, has disrupted the reconciliation measures adopted by top 
political leaders. In 2001, for instance, Japanese history textbook controversies 
drastically dampened the reconciliatory atmosphere generated by President Kim 
Dae-jung and Prime Minister Obuchi. 
Third, motives for security cooperation deriving from the North Korean 
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nuclear/missile threat have worked as a centripetal force, but they have had a 
limited impact on improving mutual perceptions. Regardless of the security 
factor, the two nations became easily stuck on historical and territorial disputes, 
which provoked ongoing negative feelings toward the other. In addition, the 
divergent security priorities between South Korea and Japan worked as a 
centrifugal force, especially during the 1998-2007 period, when the South Korean 
government launched the engagement policy toward North Korea. Even after 
2008, the two nations had a different stance on the rise of China, which therefore 
worked as centrifugal force. For South Korea, China was an important partner 
to effectively deal with the North Korea nuclear problem and prepare for future 
Korean unification, whereas Japan came to have serious concerns over the rapidly 
rising and more assertive China.  
These findings suggest that it is necessary for the two nations to launch a 
long-term reconciliation project to improve mutual perceptions. Short-term 
political/diplomatic initiatives are not unimportant in achieving that goal, but 
their impact is limited unless their wide historical perception gaps are narrowed. 
A significant number of Japanese people still believe that Japan’s annexation of 
Korea in 1910 was legal based on international law and Japanese colonial rule 
over Korea helped Korea’s modernization. They also argue that all issues of 
wartime reparation/compensation were “completely and finally” settled with the 
1965 Basic Relations Treaty with South Korea (Japan Daily Press 2013). These 
views run completely counter to mainstream Korean perspectives. Most Koreans 
highlight the illegal nature of the annexation, their great sufferings by the harsh 
colonial rule, and the exploitation of Korean material resources by Japan. They 
also think that the 1965 treaty did not include such issues as comfort women, 
Sakhalin detainees, and atomic bomb victims, so these victims still have rights to 
claim reparations by the Japanese government (Kyunghyang Shinmun 2015a).  
To narrow down such wide historical perception gaps, therefore, three 
practical recommendations can be made. First, it is vital that consistent history 
dialogues be held among historians of both countries. As we saw in the Franco–
German and German-Polish reconciliation cases, it took more than half a 
century for history textbook commissions to produce common history textbooks 
between the two countries. This enduring work played a crucial role in reducing 
historically rooted antagonisms between the former adversarial nations and 
creating a culture of mutual cooperation (Kim and Lee 2008). Though not 
supported by the two governments, some civil society organizations in South 
Korea and Japan have tried to write common history textbooks. For instance, 
since the mid-1990s, the Asia Peace and History Education Network in Seoul 
has aligned with a Japanese NGO, the Children and Textbooks Japan Network 
21, to write common history textbooks. As a result of their efforts, a textbook 
entitled “History that Opens the Future” was published in 2005. In 2015 a 
second common effort, “East Asian Modern History,” was published. According 
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to a  Korean civil activist directly, involved historians who have participated 
in these efforts have initiated a third project to write another common history 
textbook (Mikang Yang, author’s interview, Okinawa, October 30, 2015). To 
reduce historical perception gaps more effectively, the South Korean and Japanese 
governments should consistently support such civic activism and launch history 
dialogues at the governmental level as well. 
Second, South Korea and Japan need to launch and institutionalize large-
scale youth exchange programs, as Germany has done with its former adversaries 
France and Poland. It is critical not to transfer nationalistic sentiments to the 
next generation, and this can only be accomplished through genuine dialogue 
between young people in both nations. The better the mutual perceptions among 
the young generation, the better the future relationship between South Korea and 
Japan may be. In 2007 the Japanese government initiated the JENESYS Program 
(Japan-East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths). Through the 
exchange program, 3,305 Koreans went to Japan and 1,593 Japanese visited 
South Korea (Chun 2015, 326). Despite its positive impact, its scale is too small 
compared to the successful Franco-German exchange program, in which more 
than 200,000 people are annually involved (Franco-German Youth Office 2015). 
In addition, it is necessary to further strengthen sister relationships between 
local governments in the two countries. Since there are currently 197 sister 
relationships between local governments in South Korea and Japan, it would 
be relatively easy to expand the number and quality of such exchanges, thereby 
enhancing mutual understanding and cooperation (Governors Association of 
Korea 2015). All of these measures should be sustained regardless of any serious 
fluctuations in the relationship between the central governments.
Third, top political leaders in both countries should no longer use historical 
and territorial issues for their political purposes. As shown above, such negative 
acts have seriously damaged mutual perceptions of the other, working as a major 
impediment to successful reconciliation between South Korea and Japan. Cheol-
hee Park (2008b) shows that Korean political leaders no longer gain much from 
Japan-bashing. Thus, the top leaders in both nations should have a clear vision to 
construct a peaceful East Asian community in the long term rather than pursuing 
short-term, parochial political goals to augment domestic popularity.  
Though not an easy process, it will be very important for South Korea 
and Japan to achieve a successful reconciliation, as it could play a key role 
in cultivating peace and stability in the East Asian region. If the two former 
adversary states, which currently share liberal democracy and a free market 
system, can overcome deeply rooted historical antagonism and move towards 
a reconciled relationship, this could serve as a catalyst for transforming the 
East Asian region, which is currently fraught with strong rivalry, mistrust, and 
uncertainty, into a peaceful regional community.
72 Yangmo Ku
Notes
1. In recent world history, the most successful examples of international reconciliation 
could be Franco-German and German-Polish cases. For detailed accounts of these cases, 
see Yinan He (2009), Lily Gardner Feldman (2012), and Thomas U. Berger (2012).
2. As Cha (1999) posits, it might be necessary to address the role of the United States 
in analyzing variations in ROK-Japan relations during the post-Cold War period. In this 
article, however, I do not highlight the U.S. variable because it does not seem to have 
direct impact on ROK-Japan mutual perceptions, although the United States could exert 
diplomatic pressure to improve the intergovernmental relationship.
3.  The Japanese Cabinet Office has annually conducted public opinion polls, which show 
annual variations regarding Japanese perceptions of South Korea. However, there does 
not exist such an equivalent public opinion data set that shows annual variance regarding 
South Korean perceptions of Japan. Nevertheless, public opinion polls conducted by the 
Donga Daily since 1984 provide the most comparable and reliable data over fluctuations in 
Korean perceptions of Japan, even though it has not been annually collected.  
4. Japanese Cabinet Office’s public opinion polls were conducted twice in 2002, 2004, 
and 2012.
5.  For instance, 2,633 news articles dealt directly or indirectly with the Japanese 
history textbook issue between April and July 2001. Over the four-month period between 
February and May 2005, 4,703 news articles generally covered the stories related to Japan’s 
historical/territorial issues, including 147 editorial articles in major dailies such as Donga 
Daily, Hankook Ilbo, and Hankyoreh. Furthermore, the issue of the Yasukuni Shrine was 
addressed in 7,874 news articles between 2001 and 2006, which included 366 editorial 
articles in major dailies (Korean Integrated Newspaper Database System 2006).
6.  Koreans’ humanitarian support did not prevent Japan’s Ministry of Education from 
promoting its sovereignty claims over Dokdo/Takeshima. In its middle school textbook 
review in March 2011, “reflecting a conservative shift in Japanese society, all 18 geography, 
civics, and history textbooks present the island as Japanese territory, with 4 arguing that 
Korea is illegally occupying Japan’s territory, and the proportion of textbooks containing 
Japan’s territorial claim increasing from 43 to 66 percent” (Park 2011). 
7.  A summit between President Park and Prime Minister Abe was eventually held in 
November 2015 (Guardian 2015). 
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